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ENOUGH IS ENOUGH:  THE LAW COURT’S 
DECISION TO FUNCTIONALLY RAISE THE 
“REASONABLE CONNECTION” RELEVANCY 
STANDARD IN STATE V. MITCHELL  
Robert Hayes* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In State v. Mitchell,1 the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law 
Court, affirmed a jury verdict finding Thomas Mitchell guilty of a 1983 murder.2  
In doing so, the Law Court examined two issues: First, whether the trial court 
“abused its discretion in excluding evidence of an alternative suspect”;3 and 
second, whether the trial court’s decision to admit evidence stemming from an 
autopsy performed two decades before the trial violated the Confrontation Clause 
of the United States Constitution.4  In reaching the alternative suspect decision, the 
Law Court held that the evidence proffered by Mitchell did not establish a 
reasonable connection between the alternative suspect and the crime “sufficient to 
raise a reasonable doubt” as to Mitchell’s own guilt.5  Justice Silver filed a 
dissenting opinion arguing that the proffered evidence did meet the reasonable 
connection standard and should have been admitted.6  
The adversarial nature of the American criminal justice system places the 
heaviest burden on the prosecution by requiring that all elements of a crime be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.7  In order to cast reasonable doubt, a defendant 
may introduce exculpatory evidence to rebut these elements.8  A defendant’s right 
to introduce evidence is not limitless but rather is subject to the evidentiary rules of 
the jurisdiction in which the defendant faces prosecution.9  Rationally, jurisdictions 
require that evidence must be relevant in order to be admissible.10  Maine, like most 
jurisdictions, endorses a liberal stance on relevancy, defining relevant evidence in 
Rule 401 of the Maine Rules of Evidence as “evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Maine School of Law.  The Author would like to thank 
Professor Deidre Smith for her invaluable insight and guidance on this Note.   
 1. 2010 ME 73, 4 A.3d 478.  
 2. Id. ¶ 1, 4 A.3d at 480.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.  See also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.   
 5. Mitchell, 2010 ME 73, ¶ 35, 4 A.3d at 487.   
 6. Id. ¶ 48, 4 A.3d at 490 (Silver, J., dissenting).   
 7. See, e.g., Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (describing the reasonable doubt standard as 
“an ancient and honored aspect of our criminal justice system”).   
 8. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (explicitly holding “that the Due Process clause 
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged”).   
 9. See generally MARK REUTLINGER, EVIDENCE: ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CONCEPTS (Richard A. 
Epstein et al. eds., 1996) (discussing the source and workings of modern evidentiary law).   
 10. See FED. R. EVID. 402 (stating that “[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible”).   
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action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”11  
The Rules further declare, in Rule 402, that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, 
except as limited by constitutional requirements or as otherwise provided by statute 
or by these rules or by other rules applicable in the courts of this state.”12  This 
modern view of relevance stems from a need for “a greater liberality in the 
admission of evidence, thus demonstrating confidence in the ability of jurors to 
appraise the strength and weaknesses of testimony that had been excluded at 
common law because the jurors were considered too ignorant to evaluate it 
wisely.”13  Trial judges, however, still maintain a great deal of discretion under 
Rule 403 to prevent a jury from hearing evidence “if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”14  
Despite the modern thrust towards liberal relevance, trial courts across the 
nation routinely apply heightened standards of relevancy to alternative suspect 
evidence, usually resulting in its exclusion.15  These standards impose a threshold 
burden for alternative suspect evidence that falls squarely on the shoulders of the 
defendant and effectively supplants the liberal standard of relevancy gleaned from 
Rules 401 and 402.16  The Law Court has held that, in order for alternative suspect 
evidence to be admissible in Maine, the defendant must establish a reasonable 
connection between the third party and the crime sufficient to raise reasonable 
doubt as to the defendant’s own culpability.17 
Although the majority in Mitchell came to the correct result under the 
reasonable connection standard, the standard itself has become functionally 
untenable.  The Law Court first adopted the reasonable connection standard in 
order to limit the burden trial courts may place on a defendant offering alternative 
suspect evidence.18  However, through precedent affirming the standard’s 
functional application, the Law Court subsequently encouraged trial courts to 
exclude an increasing amount of alternative suspect evidence.   
                                                                                                     
 11. M.R. Evid. 401.  The text of Maine Rule of Evidence 401 is identical to that of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 401, and this Note will refer to them collectively as Rule 401.   
 12. M.R. Evid. 402.  The text of Maine Rule of Evidence 402 is identical to that of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 402, and this Note will refer to them collectively as Rule 402.   
 13. PETER L. MURRAY, MAINE EVIDENCE § 102.1 (6th ed. 2007). 
 14. M.R. Evid. 403.  The text of Maine Rule of Evidence 403 is identical to that of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403, and this Note will refer to them collectively as Rule 403.   
 15. See generally David McCord, “But Perry Mason Made It Look Easy!”: The Admissibility of 
Evidence Offered by a Criminal Defendant to Suggest That Someone Else is Guilty, 63 TENN. L. REV. 
917 (1996).   
 16. Compare M.R. Evid. 401 (defining relevant evidence as “evidence having any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence”) (emphasis added), M.R. Evid. 402 (stating that all 
relevant evidence is admissible), and M.R. Evid. 403 (establishing a balancing test for relevant evidence 
with a presumption toward admissibility), with Mitchell, 2010 ME 73, ¶ 25, 4 A.3d at 484 (noting that 
alternative suspect evidence is only admissible if it “is of sufficient probative value to raise a reasonable 
doubt as to defendant’s culpability by establishing a reasonable connection between the alternative 
suspect and the crime”) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 17. See Mitchell, 2010 ME 73, ¶ 25, 4 A.3d at 484.   
 18. See infra Part III.B. 
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This Note will begin by briefly explaining the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process concerns implicated by the exclusion of alternative suspect evidence—
namely, the defendant’s right to present a complete defense.  This Note will then 
explore the methods employed by courts to determine the admissibility of 
alternative suspect evidence—specifically, the “direct connection” doctrine 
followed by many courts and Maine’s “reasonable connection” standard.  Next, this 
Note will analyze the Law Court’s application of the reasonable connection 
standard that ultimately resulted in the exclusion of all alternative suspect evidence 
in Mitchell. 
This Note will conclude by arguing that the Mitchell majority improperly 
endorsed a heightened standard of relevancy for alternative suspect evidence.  In 
previous decisions, the Law Court noted the dangers and concerns implicated by 
applying a heightened standard.  However, in Mitchell, the majority functionally 
conflated the “reasonable connection” standard with the direct connection doctrine.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this Note will demonstrate how an 
application of the existing limitations on the admissibility of evidence set forth in 
the Maine Rules of Evidence would be a more appropriate method for determining 
the admissibility of alternative suspect evidence.   
II.  THE MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT A COMPLETE DEFENSE: A BAR ON 
ARBITRARY RULES 
The Supreme Court of the United States has not only recognized that “state 
and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules 
excluding evidence from criminal trials”19 but also that there are limits on the 
breadth of this latitude.20  Overlying the restraint on a state’s rulemaking authority 
is the idea that “criminal prosecutions must comport with prevailing notions of 
fundamental fairness.”21  One such prevailing notion of fairness is that “criminal 
defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”22  
The Court has declared that such “meaningful opportunity” is a constitutional 
privilege designed to “protect[] the innocent from erroneous conviction and 
ensure[] the integrity of our criminal justice system.”23  In order to preserve this 
constitutional privilege, the Supreme Court has struck down rules that serve no 
legitimate purpose and arbitrarily exclude evidence important to a defendant.24  For 
example, a rule precluding “principles, accomplices, or accessories” from being 
introduced as witnesses for each other,25 a rule preventing parties from impeaching 
their own witnesses,26 and a rule preventing parties from eliciting testimony 
regarding the voluntariness of a prior confession27 have all been found to impede 
                                                                                                     
 19. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998).   
 20. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006).   
 21. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984).   
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. 
 24. See Holmes, 547 U.S. at 325-26 (explaining several instances in which the Supreme Court has 
struck down arbitrary state rules of evidence).   
 25. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 15-17 (1967). 
 26. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).   
 27. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 686-87 (1986).   
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upon a defendant’s constitutional privilege to present a complete defense.  Even 
while overruling such arbitrary restrictions, however, the Supreme Court has 
maintained that, undoubtedly, a state retains the right to exclude evidence that is 
repetitive, marginally relevant, prejudicial, or misleading “through the application 
of evidentiary rules that themselves serve the interests of fairness and reliability.”28 
Citing this ability to limit evidence, many jurisdictions maintain that evidence 
offered at trial by a criminal defendant suggesting that an “alternative suspect” was 
the actual perpetrator should be subjected to a heightened relevancy standard.  
These jurisdictions offer many reasons for such a requirement, most notably the 
need to keep the trial focused on the guilt or innocence of the accused.29  States feel 
the need to “place reasonable limits on the trial of collateral issues.”30  In like 
manner, many jurisdictions view the presentation of third party perpetrator 
evidence as a waste of judicial resources.31  Further, courts have recognized that 
alternative suspect evidence is easy to fabricate.32  Accordingly, the need for 
greater limitations stems from a fear that if trial courts allow defendants to liberally 
present evidence of alternative suspects, juries will base decisions on speculative 
evidence.33  Likewise, some jurisdictions are concerned that presentation of 
alternative suspect evidence will confuse jurors.34   
Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court has recognized, a criminal defendant’s 
right to a meaningful opportunity to present a defense operates as a check on these 
limitation of alternative suspect evidence.  Most recently, in Holmes v. South 
Carolina,35 the Supreme Court struck down a state law that prevented defendants 
from offering evidence of third party guilt if the state produced DNA evidence 
implicating the defendant.36  The trial court effectively precluded the defendant 
from presenting evidence that a third party may have committed the crime because 
the proffered evidence failed to raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s own 
innocence.37  The Supreme Court of South Carolina went a step further in affirming 
the exclusion, holding that “where there is strong evidence of an appellant’s guilt, 
especially where there is strong forensic evidence, the proffered evidence about a 
third party’s alleged guilt does not raise a reasonable inference as to the appellant’s 
                                                                                                     
 28. Id. at 689-90.   
 29. See Ellen Yankiver Suni, Who Stole the Cookie from the Cookie Jar?: The Law and Ethics of 
Shifting Blame in Criminal Trials, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1680 (2000) (noting that justification for 
heightened standards of admissibility of alternative suspect evidence “relate largely to the orderly 
administration of trials”).   
 30. State v. Rabellizsa, 903 P.2d 43, 46 (Haw. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
People v. Green, 609 P.2d 468, 480 (Cal. 1980)).     
 31. See, e.g., State v. Luna, 378 N.W.2d 229, 234 (S.D. 1985) (justifying the application of the 
direct connection doctrine because it prevented defendants from “unduly tying up the court process”).   
 32. See, e.g., McCord, supra note 15, at 930 (quoting State v. May, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 328, 333 
(1833)).   
 33. See, e.g., Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1453 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting the significant state 
interest in excluding alternative suspect evidence to avoid “unsupported jury speculation”); State v. 
Scheidell, 595 N.W.2d 661, 670-71 n.10 (Wis. 1999).    
 34. See John H. Blume et al., Every Juror Wants a Story: Narrative Relevance, Third Party Guilt 
and the Right to Present a Complete Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1069, 1084 (2007).   
 35. 547 U.S. 319 (2006).   
 36. Id. at 331.   
 37. Id. at 323-24.   
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own innocence.”38  
In vacating the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court, Justice Alito, 
writing for the majority, recognized a state’s right “to establish rules excluding 
evidence from criminal trials,”39 but found that the DNA preclusion rule, as 
promulgated by the South Carolina Supreme Court, was arbitrary and unjustly 
restricted the defendant’s right to present a complete defense.40  Focusing on the 
practical application of the rule, Justice Alito found that “by evaluating only one 
party’s evidence, no logical conclusion can be reached regarding the strength of 
contrary evidence offered by the other side to rebut or cast doubt.”41  In reaching 
this decision, however, the Court explicitly accepted rules by South Carolina and 
other jurisdictions that are designed “to focus the trial on the central issues by 
excluding evidence that has only a very weak logical connection to the central 
issues.”42  Consequently, the Holmes decision serves as a warning to state and 
federal rulemakers that although their authority to promote efficiency is broad, the 
scope will ultimately be limited by traditional notions of fairness.43  
Despite differences in both reasoning and method, most jurisdictions have 
classified alternative suspect evidence as a category that requires greater scrutiny.44  
Interestingly, when considering the admission of evidence that someone else may 
have committed the crime, judges have developed admissibility requirements under 
the guise of relevancy,45 rather than under the more rational authority of Rule 403 
concerns (i.e., “undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence”).46  Nonetheless, while limiting admissibility, jurisdictions must be 
mindful of a defendant’s constitutional privilege to present a complete defense.47 
III.  LIMITING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF ALTERNATIVE SUSPECT EVIDENCE 
A.  Alternative Suspect Admissibility in Other Jurisdictions 
In order to alleviate the dangers of alternative suspect evidence, many 
                                                                                                     
 38. Id. at 324 (quoting State v. Holmes, 605 S.E.2d 19, 24 (S.C. 2004)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 39. Id. (quoting United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 40. Id. at 331.     
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 330 (emphasis added).   
 43. See id. at 324-25 (quoting Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308) (stating that the right to present a complete 
defense “is abridged by evidence rules that infringe upon a weighty interest of the accused and are 
arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  See also McCord, supra note 15, at 929-30 (noting that Holmes and its progeny established 
that the constitutionality of an evidentiary rule shall be determined by weighing the “state’s interest in 
maintaining the . . . rule” and “the defendant’s interest in presenting a defense”).     
 44. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.  See also Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The 
Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 360 (2006). 
 45. See State v. Mills, 2006 ME 134, ¶ 14, 910 A.2d 1053, 1058 (stating that “[a]dmission of 
evidence supporting an inference that another person may have committed the crime for which the 
defendant is charged ‘is subject to a threshold ruling of relevance which is largely discretionary with the 
trial court’”) (quoting MURRAY, supra note 13, at § 401.3).    
 46. M.R. Evid. 403. 
 47. See, e.g., Holmes, 547 U.S. at 331.   
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jurisdictions adopted a standard that results in the proffered evidence being 
presumptively inadmissible: the direct connection doctrine.48  This doctrine has 
been termed “the prevailing legal principle” for determining the admissibility of 
alternative suspect evidence.49  Currently, twenty-eight states employ the direct 
connection doctrine,50 although some do so under different nomenclature.51  This 
doctrine requires that proffered evidence meet not only the “more probable or less 
probable” general requirement of Rule 401,52 but also that it establish a direct 
connection between the alternative suspect and the crime committed.53  As a 
preliminary matter, a trial court employs the direct connection doctrine to 
determine whether the evidence is strong enough to be admitted.54  Discerning a 
direct connection from mere speculative evidence requires a trial judge to “look to 
the strength of the nexus between the proffered evidence and the guilt of the third 
party for the crime charged.”55 
Functionally, this threshold test for admissibility amounts to a heavy burden 
for the defense.56  Most direct connection states agree that evidence of a third 
party’s motive or opportunity to commit the crime will not suffice to establish a 
                                                                                                     
 48. See Findley & Scott, supra note 44, at 360 (noting that the direct connection doctrine reverses 
the traditional presumption of admissibility for relevant evidence).    
 49. McCord, supra note 15, at 919.   
 50. See Suni, supra note 29, at 1680 n.211 (a previous scholar had found twenty-five of thirty-six 
possible jurisdictions adhere to the doctrine, and since then three more have adopted it); Blume, supra 
note 34, at 1080 n.77 (listing Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin as direct connection states).   
 51. For instance, some employ the legitimate tendency test, according to which alternative suspect 
evidence must have a legitimate tendency to connect the alternative suspect to the crime.  See Blume, 
supra note 34, at 1080-81 (noting, however, only “slight variations” between the legitimate tendency 
test and the direct connection doctrine).   
 52. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining relevant evidence as “evidence having any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence”) (emphasis added).      
 53. See Findley & Scott, supra note 44, at 343-44 (describing the heightened evidentiary standard 
created by the direct connection doctrine).   
 54. See McCord, supra note 15, at 921 (stating that the real “issue is: What level of proof of the 
preliminary fact of alternative perpetration does the defendant have to fulfill in order to have the 
[alternative suspect] evidence admitted?”).   
 55. Stephen Michael Everhart, Putting a Burden of Production on the Defendant Before Admitting 
Evidence that Someone Else Committed the Crime Charged: Is It Constitutional?, 76 NEB. L. REV. 272, 
279 (1997).    
 56. Id. at 285 (“If the connection is strong, the evidence is admitted.  If it is weak, it is excluded.  
Courts, in this regard, are placing a burden of proof on the accused for the admission of evidence that 
someone else committed the crime charged.”).  Arguably, the connection standard is more aptly 
characterized as a burden of production.  See 29 AM. JUR. 2D Burdens of Proof, Persuasion and 
Production § 171 (2008).  If the defendant produces enough evidence to establish a direct or reasonable 
connection, the jury will hear the evidence; if not, all evidence will be excluded.  See, e.g., Mitchell, 
2010 ME 73, ¶ 38, 4 A.3d at 488.  If the probative value of each piece of alternative suspect evidence is 
weighed, and admissibility is determined on a piece-meal basis, then the burden is not one of 
production, but rather mere relevance for each piece.  See id. (stating that Mitchell’s alternative suspect 
evidence, “taken as a whole, did not rise above speculation”).  See also McCord, supra note 15, at 961 
(stating that a trial court can often avoid reversal by admitting some, but not all of the defendant’s 
alternative suspect evidence). 
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direct connection.57  Similarly, simply demonstrating that the alternative suspect 
was at the scene of the crime will not be admissible without also establishing a 
connection between the alternative suspect and the crime.58  Consequently, the 
direct connection doctrine excludes circumstantial evidence proffered by the 
defendant to cast reasonable doubt, while similar evidence proffered by the 
prosecution to push the jury beyond reasonable doubt is routinely admitted.59   
In light of this discrepancy, some jurisdictions have abandoned the direct 
connection doctrine in favor of a standard that clearly demonstrates alternative 
suspect evidence is not subject to a heightened relevancy standard.60  In People v. 
Primo,61 the Court of Appeals of New York noted that in some instances judicially-
developed relevancy standards simply “reinforce the notion that remote evidence of 
a third party’s culpability—though relevant—will not be sufficiently probative to 
outweigh the risk of trial delay, undue prejudice or jury confusion.”62  However, 
such an application envisions that trial judges will merely utilize the standard rules 
of evidence, and then couch their decisions in terms of a “direct,” “reasonable,” or 
“clear” connection standard.63  Concerns that trial judges were interpreting a “clear 
link” standard to require more than Rule 401 relevance64 and a Rule 403 balancing 
test65 led the Court of Appeals of New York to abandon “connection” nomenclature 
and ask its judges to apply “the general balancing analysis that governs the 
admissibility of all evidence.”66    
In Winfield v. United States, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals noted 
another potential danger of a heightened relevancy standard by cautioning its 
judges against “excessive mistrust of juries” in the evaluation of relevancy.67  In its 
warning, the court stated that “sifting the relevance of [alternative suspect] 
evidence is largely about drawing commonsense inferences from uncomplicated 
                                                                                                     
 57. See, e.g., Shields v. State, 166 S.W.3d 28, 32 (Ark. 2004). 
 58. See Beaty v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 196, 208 (Ky. 2003).   
 59. See McCord, supra note 15, at 975 (noting that the direct connection doctrine begs the question 
“why evidence offered by a criminal defendant that merely casts suspicion on an [alternative suspect is] 
almost invariably excluded, while evidence offered by the prosecution that merely casts suspicion on the 
defendant [is] routinely admitted-and usually without any explicit effort to balance probative value 
against countervailing considerations”).   
 60. See, e.g., People v. Primo, 753 N.E.2d 164, 168 (N.Y. 2001); Winfield v. United States, 676 
A.2d 1, 4 (D.C. 1996); State v. Gibson, 44 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Ariz. 2002).   
 61. 753 N.E.2d 164, 168 (N.Y. 2001).   
 62. Id.   
 63. See id. 
 64. New York’s definition of relevancy is substantially similar to Maine Rule of Evidence 401 and 
Federal Rule of Evidence 401, defining relevant evidence as evidence that has “any tendency in reason 
to prove the existence of any material fact, i.e., it makes determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence.”  People v. Scarola, 525 N.E.2d 728, 732 (N.Y. 
1988).   
 65. The New York balancing test is substantially similar to Maine Rule of Evidence 403 and 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, allowing a judge to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
outweighed by the prospect of trial delay, undue prejudice to the opposing party, confusing the issues or 
misleading the jury.”  Primo, 753 N.E.2d at 167.   
 66. Id. at 168.    
 67. Winfield, 676 A.2d at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Allen v. United States, 603 
A.2d 1219, 1224 (D.C. 1992)). 
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facts, something we regularly entrust to juries.”68   
Similarly, in State v. Gibson, the Supreme Court of Arizona abandoned a 
heightened relevancy standard in favor of a standard application of the rules of 
evidence,69 finding that tests such as direct connection or clear link place too much 
emphasis on the “third party’s guilt or innocence.”70  Rather, the court held that 
Rules 401, 402, and 403,71 used in conjunction, provide the proper mode for 
determining the admissibility of alternative suspect evidence.72  Arizona’s high 
court’s decision came only after a dissenting appellate judge pointed out that the 
flawed standard required a defendant to prove, to the judge’s satisfaction, that 
another person actually committed, or was “largely connected,” to the crime 
charged.73   
Further, some states have chosen to render the alternative suspect decision on 
Rule 403 grounds alone, noting the relevance, but finding the probative value of 
alternative suspect evidence to be substantially outweighed “by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”74  
Still, some states adopt a compromise between requiring a direct connection and 
applying the traditional rules of evidence.75   
B.  Alternative Suspect Admissibility in Maine 
Although Maine judges share the concerns of those in other jurisdictions about 
the dangers of a liberal stance on alternative suspect evidence, Maine has 
articulated a somewhat more relaxed standard for determining the admissibility of 
the proffered evidence.76  Maine’s standard requires that the proffered evidence 
formulate a reasonable connection between the alternative suspect and the crime 
“sufficient . . . to raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s culpability.”77  For 
the evidence to meet this sufficiency requirement, “it must be more than 
speculative and conjectural.”78  Further, the evidence must do more than create a 
mere suspicion that the alternative suspect committed the crime.79  An examination 
                                                                                                     
 68. Id.  
 69. See State v. Gibson, 44 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Ariz. 2002).   
 70. Id. (citing Winfield, 676 A.2d at 4).   
 71. Arizona Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403 are identical to Maine Rules of Evidence 401, 
402, and 403.   
 72. Gibson, 44 P.3d at 1004.   
 73. See id. (noting that the court agrees with Judge Gerber’s dissent in which he states that “this rule 
forces a defendant to prove to a judge’s satisfaction that another person ‘really’ committed the crime or 
was ‘largely’ connected to it”).   
 74. See Everhart, supra note 55, at 281 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 
403) (pointing out that some courts determine the admissibility of alternative suspect evidence under 
Rule 403).   
 75. See id. at 283 (explaining that some states, such as Maine, require a reasonable connection 
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt, while others utilize a combination of tests).   
 76. See State v. Robinson, 628 A.2d 664, 667 (Me. 1993) (rejecting a “clear link” standard for 
alternative suspect evidence, but noting that a connection must be “reasonably established”).   
 77. State v. Conlogue, 474 A.2d 167, 172 (Me. 1984).   
 78. State v. Dechaine, 572 A.2d 130, 134 (Me. 1990).   
 79. Id. (quoting Fortson v. State, 379 A.2d 147, 153 (Ind. 1978)). 
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of the lineage of Mitchell demonstrates that the Law Court has incrementally 
heightened what is now a significant hurdle for the admissibility of alternative 
suspect evidence.80 
In a 1981 decision, State v. Leclair,81 the Law Court abstained from deciding 
whether it was appropriate for a trial judge to exclude alternative suspect evidence 
based on a Rule 401 relevancy ruling rather than on any heightened connection 
theory.82  In doing so, however, the Law Court noted that “in appropriate 
circumstances” a defendant has the right to introduce evidence that another party 
“had the motive, intent, and opportunity to commit [the crime].”83  The court also 
noted the trial court’s discretion to exclude the evidence, citing Maine Rules of 
Evidence 402 and 403.84   
Three years later, in State v. Conlogue,85 the Law Court reversed a decision 
excluding alternative suspect evidence demonstrating motive, opportunity, and 
previous similar acts by the alternative suspect.86  The court noted that a trial court 
“should allow the defendant wide latitude to present all the evidence relevant to his 
defense, unhampered by piecemeal rulings on admissibility.”87   
In the 1990 decision State v. Deschaine,88 the Law Court distorted its standard 
by holding that the “evidence incriminating another person must be competent and 
confined to substantive facts which create more than a mere suspicion that such 
other person committed the crime.”89  This language established the first 
requirement that a defendant’s alternative suspect evidence show a specific 
connection between the potential alternative suspect and the crime committed.90  
The Law Court went on to state that “[t]he connection between the alternative 
perpetrator and the crime must be reasonably established by the admissible 
evidence the defendant is prepared to offer.”91  Noting a need to promote judicial 
efficiency, the Law Court warned that a defendant “cannot be allowed to use his 
trial to conduct an investigation that he hopes will convert what amounts to 
speculation into a connection between the other person and the crime.”92  Cautious, 
however, not to develop an unworkable burden, the court analogized its previous 
decisions in Leclair and Conlogue to Maine Rules of Evidence 40193 and 402,94 
                                                                                                     
 80. See Mitchell, 2010 ME 73, ¶ 52, 4 A.3d at 491 (Silver, J., dissenting) (citing previous alternative 
suspect case law and noting that the evidence in Mitchell is stronger).   
 81. 425 A.2d 182 (Me. 1981). 
 82. See id. at 187.   
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 84. Id. 
 85. 474 A.2d 167 (Me. 1984).   
 86. Id. at 172.   
 87. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Leclair, 425 A.2d at 187).   
 88. 572 A.2d 130 (Me. 1990). 
 89. Id. at 134 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fortson, 379 N.E.2d at 153).   
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than mere relevance.  See M.R. Evid. 401; supra note 56 and accompanying text.        
 91. Deschaine, 572 A.2d at 134.    
 92. Id. (citing State v. Williams, 462 A.2d 491, 492 (Me. 1983)).   
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respectively.   
Three years later, in State v. Robinson,95 the Law Court expressly declined to 
adopt a direct connection standard, stating that such a standard “placed too high a 
burden on a criminal defendant who is without the vast investigatory resources of 
the State.”96  In doing this, Maine became the first jurisdiction to conclude that 
requiring a clear connection between an alternative suspect and the crime was 
excessive.97  Nevertheless, the Law Court has continued to routinely affirm the 
exclusion of alternative suspect evidence based upon trial court findings that a 
“reasonable connection” has not been established.98  In fact, Conlogue stands as the 
last instance in which the Law Court found a trial court’s exclusion of alternative 
suspect evidence to be reversible error.99 
In 2010, the Law Court again affirmed the exclusion of alternative suspect 
evidence in State v. Waterman.100  In Waterman, the defense sought to ask 
questions on direct examination that would implicate the witness as an alternative 
suspect.101  The trial court found that Waterman had not established an adequate 
foundation, and precluded defense counsel from pursuing that line of 
questioning.102  In affirming this ruling, the Law Court made strides toward 
abandoning the reasonable connection standard by stating that “[u]ltimately the 
court must exercise its discretion in considering whether to allow a question that 
could elicit relevant evidence . . . but, if based only on speculation, would waste 
time, mislead the jury, or lead to confusion of the issues.”103  The Law Court noted 
the relevance of the potentially exculpatory evidence but found that Waterman 
failed to demonstrate opportunity or motive of the alternative suspect.104  The Law 
Court suggested that if Waterman had presented evidence suggesting motive or 
opportunity, the questioning would have been allowed.105  However, despite these 
comments in the dicta of Waterman, the Law Court reinvigorated the strength of 
the “reasonable connection” standard three months later in Mitchell. 
                                                                                                     
 94. See id. (quoting Conlogue, 474 A.2d at 172, and citing M.R. Evid. 402) (stating that “[t]he 
evidence ‘must be admitted if it is of sufficient probative value to raise a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant’s culpability’”).    
 95. 628 A.2d 664 (Me. 1993).   
 96. Id. at 667.   
 97. See McCord, supra note 15, at 938.   
 98. See, e.g., State v. Waterman, 2010 ME 45 ¶¶ 37, 39, 41, 995 A.2d 243, 251-52 (holding that 
alternative suspect evidence was properly excluded because there was no evidence suggesting motive or 
opportunity, only that the alternative suspects knew and interacted with the victim); State v. Mills, 2006 
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connecting the alternative suspect to the crime was her prior experience with knives); State v. Bridges, 
2003 ME 103, ¶ 42, 829 A.2d 247, 259 (affirming exclusion of inadmissible character evidence); State 
v. Robinson, 1999 ME 86, ¶ 19, 730 A.2d 684, 688 (holding that evidence was properly excluded where 
it did not indicate that the alternative suspect had access to the victim or the physical characteristics of 
the perpetrator).  
 99. See MURRAY, supra note 13, at § 401.3.    
 100. 2010 ME 45, 995 A.2d 243.   
 101. Id. ¶ 21, 995 A.2d at 249.   
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. ¶ 36, 995 A.2d at 251.   
 104. Id. ¶ 37, 995 A.2d at 251-52.   
 105. Id. ¶ 38, 995 A.2d at 252.     
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IV.  THE MITCHELL DECISION 
A.  Factual Background 
Thomas Mitchell’s father died in 1980, bequeathing Mitchell’s childhood 
home to his stepmother, who subsequently sold the home to Judith Flagg.106  
Mitchell had left some personal belongings at his old house, and had arranged with 
Flagg to pick them up.107  When Mitchell arrived at the arranged time, the Flaggs 
were not home.108  When Mitchell returned to the Flagg household for a second 
time, Flagg’s husband told him that the items had been delivered to the former 
realtor’s office.109  Upon hearing this Mitchell seemed unhappy and left.110  Nearly 
two years later, Judith Flagg was murdered.111   
The Flaggs’ home in Fayette is located seventy miles north of Portland.112  At 
7:00 a.m. on the morning of the murder, a South Portland police officer saw 
Mitchell driving a two-toned vehicle north on Interstate 295.113  At approximately 
10:30 a.m., Flagg was on the phone with her sister.114  According to her sister, 
Flagg put the phone down to answer the door, returned to the phone, and said a 
friend of her husband’s had arrived and she would have to call back.115  At 10:45 
a.m., Flagg called her brother to tell him that her husband’s friend was at her house 
and was having car problems.116  Flagg’s brother, a mechanic, offered to come 
assist with the car, but the unidentified man said he would stop somewhere in 
Fayette.117  Around 12:00 p.m., a mail carrier in the neighborhood saw a man 
driving erratically near the Flaggs’ house.118  At 2:00 p.m., Flagg’s brother-in-law 
installed a new starter in a truck in the Flaggs’ driveway.119  The brother-in-law did 
not see Flagg, did not enter the home, and left after forty-five minutes.120  At 11:00 
p.m., Flagg’s husband found her body lying on the floor with the telephone in 
hand.121  
During the investigation into the murder, police found suspicious footprints in 
the snow leading to Flagg’s house.122  Investigators, with the help of the mail 
carrier, developed a composite sketch of the erratic driver seen the day of the 
murder.123  Mitchell was initially considered a suspect because sole patterns on a 
                                                                                                     
 106. Mitchell, 2010 ME 73, ¶ 3, 4 A.3d at 480.   
 107. Id. ¶ 4, 4 A.3d at 480-81.     
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pair of boots he owned matched the suspicious prints and because he also owned a 
car similar to that of the erratic driver.124  The Deputy Chief Medical Examiner 
collected samples from the crime scene and performed an autopsy on the body.125  
These samples sat in the Maine State Police Crime Laboratory until 2006, at which 
time the lab’s DNA specialist developed profiles from the samples collected.126  
The DNA profiles matched the victim and Mitchell.127  “The probability of a 
random match was one in 69.4 quadrillion.”128   
In September 2006, Mitchell was indicted for the murder of Flagg.129  The 
prosecution filed a motion in limine, requiring Mitchell to submit offers of proof 
for any alternative suspect evidence he intended to introduce at trial.130  Mitchell 
presented offers of proof that implicated a male neighbor of the Flaggs in the 
murder.131  The facts offered by Mitchell included evidence that the male neighbor 
owned boots with a sole pattern that resembled the track found at the crime scene, 
possessed clothes similar to those worn by the erratic driver, owned a car similar to 
that driven by the erratic driver, was having car troubles, offered an unreliable alibi, 
acted suspiciously after the murder, had dated Flagg’s best friend, and that Flagg 
took the friend’s side in a dispute that ended the relationship.132  Further, a finger 
print examiner could not rule out the neighbor as the source of fingerprints found at 
the crime scene.133  The trial court considered the proffered evidence, heard 
arguments, and ultimately granted the State’s motion to exclude all of the 
evidence.134  At trial, Mitchell testified that he was with his aunt on the day of the 
murder, and that his DNA at the crime scene could have been lifted from a 
bloodstain in Flagg’s carpet stemming from an injury he sustained while living in 
the home.135  The jury found Mitchell guilty of murder, and the court sentenced 
him to life in prison.136 
B.  The Majority’s Application of the Reasonable Connection Standard 
In affirming the trial court’s decision to exclude the alternative suspect 
evidence, the Law Court functionally raised the strength of the connection required 
to admit evidence of third party guilt.137  The court reiterated its commitment to the 
reasonable connection standard by noting that trial courts should only admit 
alternative suspect evidence if the offered proof is otherwise admissible, and “is of 
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evidence).   
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sufficient probative value to raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s 
culpability by establishing a reasonable connection between the alternative suspect 
and the crime.”138   
Examining the evidence excluded by the trial judge, the court first found that 
one piece of evidence offered—testimony that the sole pattern on the male 
neighbor’s boots matched a footprint at the scene—was inadmissible under Maine 
Rule of Evidence 701.139  Next, the Law Court assumed the remaining evidence 
was otherwise admissible but found that the facts “taken as a whole, did not rise 
above the level of speculation.”140  Weighing the probative value of the evidence, 
the court found that the facts presented only “weak proof of motive or propensity, 
and only moderately probative evidence of opportunity, mistaken identity, or 
suspicious post-crime behavior.”141  Ultimately, the Law Court ruled that the 
evidence was insufficient to establish a reasonable connection between the male 
neighbor and the murder and, therefore, that Mitchell was not denied a meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense as prescribed by the Constitution.142 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Silver argued that the evidence proffered by 
Mitchell established a reasonable connection between the alternative suspect and 
the crime sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to Mitchell’s own guilt.143  
Justice Silver pointed out that the probative value of much of the evidence 
presented by Mitchell seemed to meet the low burden announced in Holmes—that 
proffered evidence establish more than “a very weak logical connection to the 
central issues.”144  Consequently, “it [was] for the jury to decide whether it [was] 
convinced by the evidence.”145  The dissenting opinion also noted that Mitchell’s 
evidence was far stronger than that offered in previous Law Court decisions that 
had affirmed the exclusion of alternative suspect evidence.146  Justice Silver’s 
parting point was that the trial court should not have excluded the alternative 
suspect evidence on an “all or nothing” basis but rather, “the court [should] admit 
evidence that is sufficiently probative while excluding other evidence that is too 
attenuated or that presents too great a likelihood of misleading or confusing the 
jury.”147 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Mitchell decision places an excessive and unnecessary burden on a 
criminal defendant’s ability to present alternative suspect evidence.  In Mitchell, 
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the majority did not offer an explanation as to why it deemed the motive or 
propensity evidence as weak, nor did the opinion explain why the remaining 
evidence of opportunity, identity, and suspicious post crime behavior, with 
admittedly moderate probative value,148 was also excluded.  Moreover, the majority 
unnecessarily lumped all alternative suspect evidence together, and affirmed a 
blanket exclusion of such evidence.149  Most alarming, however, is that a 
specialized test to determine the admissibility of relevant alternative suspect 
evidence demonstrated distrust in a trial judge’s ability to balance relevance with 
countervailing factors, undervalued the Maine Rules of Evidence, and fostered 
distrust in a jury’s ability to assign evidence its proper probative value.   
This most recent application of the reasonable connection standard bears 
considerable functional resemblance to the direct connection doctrine, as adopted 
by other states, which Maine has purportedly rejected.  If the evidence proffered in 
Mitchell falls short of establishing a “reasonable connection” between the 
alternative suspect and the crime, it is unclear what evidence would be sufficient.  
Just like courts in direct connection doctrine jurisdictions, the Law Court affirmed 
a decision to exclude evidence of moderate probative value—Mitchell’s proffered 
evidence does everything but establish a direct connection.  As Justice Silver’s 
dissent points out, Mitchell’s evidence “established a link between the [alternative 
suspect] and the victim, a possible motive, opportunity, and suspicious behavior.  
The only item missing is DNA evidence.”150  By the phrase “the only item 
missing,” Justice Silver alluded to the fact that Mitchell’s alternative suspect 
evidence was markedly similar to the inculpatory evidence used in his 
prosecution—when comparing the prosecution’s evidence against Mitchell with 
Mitchell’s evidence against the alternative suspect, it becomes clear that Mitchell’s 
case only lacked DNA evidence placing the alternative suspect at the scene.  By 
requiring a connection this substantial, the Law Court squandered an opportunity to 
maintain any meaningful distinction between “reasonable” and “direct.”  Mitchell 
thus establishes that the “reasonable connection” standard does little more than 
dangle an admissibility “carrot” in front of defendants.   
The Law Court’s functional conflation of the “reasonable connection” and the 
direct connection standards is not the only concern: any “connection” standard 
poses significant dangers to the notions of fairness supporting a criminal justice 
system.  As the Court of Appeals of New York noted in Primo, the true danger of a 
connection standard is that, at the very least, it unnecessarily opens the door for 
trial judges to believe that a defendant’s proffered alternative suspect evidence 
requires more than relevance and a weighing of probative value and countervailing 
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considerations.151  More appropriately, a trial judge’s focus should only be on the 
probative value of the proffered evidence with regard to the guilt or innocence of 
the accused, not the guilt or innocence of a third party.152  By abandoning a 
connection standard, the Mitchell majority could have ensured that trial judges 
subsequently focus their alternative suspect decisions on the modern rules of 
evidence, rather than applying any heightened standard of relevance.    
Moreover, connection standards dangerously “constitute a form of prescribed 
tunnel vision.”153  With a connection standard, the criminal justice system 
presumes that prosecutors and law enforcement have apprehended the correct 
suspect, and, subsequently, increases the likelihood of a wrongful conviction.154  
The fundamental adage of “innocent until proven guilty” requires that evidence of 
alternative suspects be explored to the fullest extent possible.  To forbid a 
defendant from introducing evidence of a third party’s guilt seems to unjustly 
presume the prime suspect’s guilt.  Indeed, if defendants were allowed to introduce 
a greater amount of alternative suspect evidence investigators would have greater 
incentive to investigate and rule out alternative suspects.155   
Worse still, when relevant evidence is excluded, and the defense is prevented 
from creating third party inferences, the prosecution’s road beyond reasonable 
doubt becomes much easier to travel.156  In Mitchell, the prosecution was not 
required to overcome the moderate probative doubt raised by the alternative 
suspect evidence because the trial judge prevented the jury from hearing it.  This 
decision made it impossible for the defense to create any inferences that someone 
else may have committed the crime.     
The majority reasoned that the reasonable connection standard has no 
significant effect on the prosecution’s burden of proof; arguably the evidence 
excluded by the standard was incapable of raising reasonable doubt in a rational 
juror.157  However, such rationale presupposes that the right party is making the 
reasonable doubt determinations.  The task of determining the strength of each 
party’s evidence, and subsequently reasonable doubt, is the exclusive province of 
the jury.  The Sixth Amendment places trust in a jury of the defendant’s peers, in 
part because a jury may be more apt to protect a defendant’s rights than a judge 
would be.158  Assuming the proffered evidence is both relevant and is not 
substantially outweighed by Rule 403 considerations, when a trial judge makes a 
preliminary determination that reasonable doubt cannot be found, he erroneously 
                                                                                                     
 151. See Primo, 753 N.E.2d at 168.  But see McCord, supra note 15, at 974-76 (arguing that the 
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overrides a function of the jury.  Even more disconcerting is the implication that, 
by overriding this function, the Law Court has inherently decided that a jury’s 
erroneous acquittal is more dangerous than a wrongful conviction.159  Such a result 
undermines a fundamental safeguard of the criminal justice system—the notion that 
“convicting the innocent is ‘far worse’ than letting the guilty go free.”160   
In addition, by endorsing a heightened standard, the majority ignored the 
Supreme Court’s attempt to refocus state judges on the liberal relevancy standard 
of Rule 401.161  Justice Alito’s declaration in Holmes that it is appropriate for a 
court to focus a trial by “excluding evidence that has only a very weak logical 
connection to the central issues”162 bears considerable resemblance to the practical 
application of Maine Rules of Evidence 401 and 402.  Simply put, Holmes 
implicitly states that strictly adhering to the rules of evidence provides a logical 
approach to admitting or excluding alternative suspect evidence and ensures that a 
defendant is afforded constitutional privileges.  Certainly, evidence of an 
alternative suspect such as that offered in Mitchell (i.e., evidence of third party 
motive, opportunity, similarities with defendant, and suspicious post-crime 
behavior) renders a fact of consequence (i.e., that Mitchell committed the murder) 
less probable.  Thus, preventing the jury from hearing this evidence undermined 
Mitchell’s meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense by limiting the 
jury’s access to relevant evidence. 
Moreover, application of Maine Rule of Evidence 403 to proffered alternate 
suspect evidence alleviates the very concerns that prompted the development of the 
reasonable connection standard.163  Under Rule 403, speculative alternative suspect 
evidence of only slight probative value would be substantially outweighed by 
“considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.”164  Therefore, if, as feared, a jury bases an acquittal on 
speculative evidence, the trial judge is to blame for not properly balancing the 
evidence’s probative value against countervailing considerations.   
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the presentation of alternative suspect evidence 
of moderate exculpatory value would confuse jurors.  In the case of Mitchell, even 
if the jury heard the alternative suspect evidence, they likely would have arrived at 
the same conclusion—conviction.  Any rational juror assigning weight to the 
substantial DNA evidence inculpating Mitchell, and the circumstantial alternative 
suspect evidence, would have voted in favor of conviction.  This assertion, 
however, can only be made in hindsight.  Under the Supreme Court’s logic in 
Holmes,165 it would be erroneous for a trial judge to engage in such a weighing 
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“traditionally . . . reserved for the trier of fact.”166  Certainly, viewed without regard 
to the strong DNA evidence of the prosecution, the admittedly moderate probative 
evidence proffered by Mitchell was relevant, would likely survive a Rule 403 
balancing test, and subsequently, was worthy of admittance.   
It is notable, however, that, given the broad deference granted to trial judges in 
the realm of determining relevancy, the standard of review used at the appellate 
level, regardless of the threshold relevance test employed, will be abuse of 
discretion.167  Under such a constrained standard of review, the Law Court has little 
choice but to affirm the decision of the trial court.  Such a constraint should not be 
viewed as an excuse for the numerous decisions affirming exclusions, but rather as 
a further reason for abandoning a heightened relevancy standard.  Subjecting 
alternative suspect evidence to the same rigors as other evidence, the Law Court 
could rest assured that in affirming a life sentence168 from the cold record, the 
defendant was allowed every opportunity to rebut his guilt.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The “reasonable connection” standard, as refined in Mitchell, poses 
considerable danger to the Maine criminal justice system.  The Law Court’s 
previous decisions, combined with the new functional hurdle in Mitchell,169 
demonstrate that little alternative suspect evidence—except perhaps third party 
confessions170—will ever successfully meet the test for admissibility.  Functionally, 
the standard amounts to a presumption of inadmissibility for potentially relevant 
evidence that casts doubt on the defendant’s guilt.  In the context of criminal 
prosecution, especially those resulting in life imprisonment, it is illogical and 
prejudicial to exclude exculpatory evidence of moderate probative value.  Although 
rationalized under the auspices of judicial efficiency, the “reasonable connection” 
standard unnecessarily presumes a trial judge is incapable of making appropriate 
determinations under the rules of evidence, and also fosters a distrust in a jury’s 
ability to properly evaluate such evidence.  Subjecting alternative suspect evidence 
to the same rigors as other proffered evidence is the safest way to ensure a 
defendant is allowed to exercise the constitutional privilege of presenting a 
complete defense.      
Absent omnipotent authority, the criminal justice system can never be 
completely certain that the person found guilty for a crime is, in fact, the person 
who committed the crime.  In light of this imperfect nature, notions of fundamental 
fairness afford the accused substantial protections—innocent until proven guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, right to trial by a jury of peers, right to present a 
complete defense—in order to prevent unjust convictions.  Even in a case like 
Mitchell, where there is strong DNA evidence implicating the defendant, it is 
merely improbable that an alternative suspect committed the crime; determining 
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how improbable is the province of the jury.  In the aftermath of Mitchell, the 
reasonable connection relevancy standard ultimately thwarts essential protections 
of the Maine criminal justice system by assuming it is impossible, rather than 
merely improbable, that another person could have committed the crime.   

